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Abstract: 
 
Advanced market economies are characterized by a continuous process of creative destruction. Market forces 
and technological developments play a major role in shaping this process, but institutional and policy settings 
also influence firms’ decision to enter, to expand if successful and to exit if competition becomes unbearable.  In 
this paper, we focus on the effects of financial development on the entry of new firms and the expansion of 
successful new businesses. Drawing from harmonized firm-level data for 16 industrialized and emerging 
economies, we find that access to finance matters most for the entry of small firms and in sectors that are more 
dependent upon external finance. This finding is robust to controlling for other potential entry barriers (labor 
market regulations and entry regulations). On the other hand, financial development has either no effect or a 
negative effect on entry by large firms.  Access to finance also helps new firms expand if successful. Both private 
credit and stock market capitalization are important for promoting entry and post entry growth of firms. 
Altogether, these results suggest that, despite significant progress over the past decade, many countries, 
including those in Continental Europe, should improve their financial markets so as to get the most out of 
creative destruction, by encouraging the entry of new (especially small) firms and the post-entry growth of 
successful young businesses.     
JEL classification: D21, D92, L11, G32    
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was prepared for the April 20-21 2007 Panel Meeting of Economic Policy in Frankfurt.   1.  Introduction 
 
There is growing empirical evidence suggesting that market economies are characterized by a 
continuous process of reallocation of resources and that this process play a major role for 
aggregate productivity and output growth (e.g. Olley and Pakes, 1996; Foster et al. 2002; 
Griliches and Regev, 1995; Bartelsman  et al. 2004; and Aghion and Howitt, 2006). Resource 
reallocation is driven by incumbent firms adapting to market and technological changes, but 
also by firm dynamics – the entry of new firms, their expansion in the initial years of life and 
the exit of obsolete units. Firm dynamics is sizeable: several studies suggests that about 10 to 
15 percent of all firms are either created or closed down every year in industrialized and 
emerging economies (see Caves, 1998; Bartelsman and Doms, 2000 and Ahn, 2000 for 
surveys). Many of the new firms that enter the market fail in the initial years of life, but those 
that survive tend to grow, often at a higher pace than incumbents firms (see e.g. Geroski, 
1995; Sutton, 1997; Bartelsman et al. 2004).   
 
While market forces and technological progress play a major role for firm dynamics, we do 
not fully understand what drives the differences in entry, post-entry and exit rates we observe 
across countries and over time. Previous studies have suggested a number of barriers to the 
entry and the post-entry growth, including: (a) adjustment costs induced by the R&D and/or 
advertising of incumbent firms (e.g. Sutton, 1999; Geroski, 1995); (b) the administrative costs 
of creating a new firm (e.g. Djankov et al. 2002; Bertrand and Kramarz 2002; Desai et al. 
2003; Scarpetta et al. 2002; Fisman and Sarria Allende, 2004);  Klapper et al. 2006); and (c) 
labor market regulations (e.g. Micco and Pages, 2006; Haltiwanger et al. 2006).
2  
 
In this paper, we focus on credit constraints as a potential barrier to the entry and post entry 
growth of firms. First, we develop a stylized model in which sunk entry costs as well as 
post-entry growth potentials affect the entry decision and the post entry expansion of 
credit-constrained firms. This model allows us to also assess whether financial development 
has a differential effect on entry by firms of different size, where size affects firms' ability to 
borrow, and also to analyze the impact of financial development on the post-entry growth of 
firms. A main prediction of the model is that relaxing credit constraints has a more positive 
effect on the entry of small firms than of larger firms -- it may even discourage entry by the 
latter -- and that higher financial development increases post-entry growth of successful new 
firms. Second, we test these predictions empirically by using a harmonized firm-level panel 
data on entry and post entry growth of firms by sector, size classes and time in a sample of 16 
OECD, transition, and Latin American countries over the 1990's. Contrary to most datasets 
used in the literature, our firm-level indicators are drawn from the entire population of firms 
                                                 
2   Djankov et al. (2002) used entry costs data from the World Bank (Doing Business Indicators) and 
showed that start-up costs are significantly higher in continental Europe than in the U.S. and generally 
higher in developing and most emerging economies than in industrialized countries. Desai, Gompers 
and Lerner (2003) use cross-country data to show that entry regulations have a negative effect on firm 
entry, while Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) look at the effect of the new zoning regulations in France 
on the expansion decisions of French retailers. Scarpetta et al (2002) use firm level data from 10 
OECD countries to show that high product market and labor market regulations are negatively 
correlated with the entry of small and medium size enterprises. Fisman and Sarria Allende (2004) 
document that in countries with higher entry regulations, industries react to new growth opportunities 
by expanding existing firms instead of by creating new firms. Klapper et al. (2004) use the Amadeus 
database  to show that entry regulations hamper entry in European countries, particularly in those 
sectors where entry should “naturally” occur. Finally, Micco and Pages (2006) and Haltiwanger et al. 
(2006) find evidence that stringent labor regulations, by raising labor adjustment costs, discourage the 
entry of firms especially in sectors characterized by relatively high job turnover.  with at least 1 (or 10) employees and properly account for the entry (and exit) of firms. This 
dataset also allows considering entry rates by size classes and assessing post-entry growth of 
new firms over the initial years of their life. Consistently with our theoretical model, size is a 
crucial variable in the analysis of entry and post-entry growth: it accounts for the dominant 
fraction of the total variance in entry rates when compared with country or industry effects.  
 
In the empirical analysis of entry and post-entry growth we consider different indicators of 
financial development. Given the difficulty of directly measuring its efficiency, most papers 
use indirect measures of size of financial intermediation and the structure of financial systems 
(Levine, 2005). We therefore consider the ratio of private credit and stock market 
capitalization to GDP. These are outcome variables and may be somewhat endogenous.   
However, we also instrument these variables using a detailed set of regulatory indicators that 
characterize the banking and securities markets. In the empirical analysis, we also use a 
difference-in-difference approach, following Rajan and Zingales (1998), to minimize 
problems of omitted variable bias and other miss-specifications. In particular, we interact 
different indicators of financial development with the relative dependence on external 
financing of the corresponding sector in the United States. The resulting difference in 
difference approach allows exploiting within-country differences between industry/sizes 
based on the interaction between country and industry characteristics.  
 
Our main empirical results can be summarized as follows. First, we replicate earlier findings, 
namely that higher financial development enhances new firm entry in sectors that depend 
more heavily upon external finance. Second, we show that the entry of smallest size firms 
benefits the most from higher financial development, whereas the entry of largest firms is 
negatively correlated with credit. Third, we find robust evidence that financial development 
enhances post-entry growth of firms in sectors that depend more upon external finance. Our 
results are robust to using synthetic indicators of banks or financial market regulations to 
proxy for financial development and to also considering other policy variables, namely labor 
market regulation or entry costs. 
 
This paper contributes to an extensive literature on finance, entry regulation, 
entrepreneurship, and growth. Here, we shall just mention the papers that are most closely 
related to our study.  From a theoretical stand point, Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000) assess 
the interplay between financial constraints and entrepreneurship in the context of a general 
equilibrium model with heterogeneous wealth endowments and heterogeneous investment 
costs. Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2002) analyze lending and firm growth in a dynamic 
model where credit constraints arise from limited enforcement, whereas Clementi and 
Hopenhayn (2002) do the same using a model in which credit constraints arise from 
asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers.  
 
On the empirical side, Evans and Jovanovic (1989) use data from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Young Men to show that entrepreneurship, measured by the probability of entering 
self-employment and the volume of investments, is subject to binding liquidity constraints. 
Closer to our paper, Rajan and Zingales (1998) using industry-level data from the UNIDO 
show that financially-dependent industries tend to have better growth performance in more 
financially developed countries. Using similar data, Beck et al. (2005) show that financial 
development is more growth-enhancing for industries that rely more on small firms. Klapper, 
Laeven and Rajan (2005) use a data set of European firms to show that financial development 
has a positive effect on firm entry in sectors that are more dependent on external financing. 
They also suggest that strict entry regulations are associated with lower entry rates and larger entry size in sectors with higher natural turnover rates. Alfaro and Charlton (2006) use a large 
cross-sectional firm-level data set to show that reducing restrictions on international capital 
flows enhances firm entry. De Serres et al. (2006) find that regulation that is more conducive 
to competitive and efficient financial systems has a significant positive impact on sectoral 
output and productivity growth as well as on the entry of new firms in a sample of OECD 
countries. Finally, Perotti and Volpin (2004) use cross-country data from UNIDO to argue 
that democracy has a positive effect on net entry by increasing the degree of investment 
protection. However, these papers put little or no emphasis on firm size at entry or on post 
entry growth. They also tend to rely on country specific data or cross country data that do not 
allow computing entry rates but rather net entry rates (i.e. the net change in the number of 
businesses in a given industry, e.g. UNIDO data) or tend to exclude many small-sized 
businesses and/or cannot fully track the entry and exit of firms (e.g. most commercial 
databases providing accounting information).  
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the firm-level database used in the 
paper and provides a brief overview of the magnitude of entry and post entry growth across 
countries, industries and size categories. The section also presents the indicators of financial 
development used in the analysis. Section 3 presents our theoretical model and discusses its 
predictions which we then test in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results for the entry and post entry regressions. Section 5 draws some policy considerations 
from the empirical results, while Section 6 provides our concluding remarks and some policy 
considerations.  
 
2.  Entry and post-entry growth: the data and some stylized facts 
 
The analysis developed in this paper is motivated by growing empirical evidence suggesting 
large firm dynamism (entry and exit of firms and post-entry growth) in all market economies 
and a significant role that this dynamism plays in promoting reallocation of resources and 
ultimately productivity growth. The evidence on the links between firm dynamics and 
productivity was originally concentrated in the U.S. but it has recently been extended to cover 
a wide range of OECD and increasingly developing and emerging economies.
3 It suggests 
that, for example, net entry – the sum of the contribution of entry and that of exit of firms –
 can account for about 20-25 percent of aggregate labor productivity growth in manufacturing 
in some EU countries, and for more than 30 percent in emerging economies.
4 This direct 
contribution of entry and exit to productivity is also coupled by an indirect effect stemming 
from the market contestability effect, that is to say the strong pressure that firm entry and exit 
puts on incumbents to improve their own efficiency in order to maintain their market shares. 
There is also clear evidence that the contribution of new firms to overall productivity growth 
                                                 
3.  See, among others, Geroski (1995); Caves (1998); Sutton (1997); Pakes and Ericson (1998); Ahn 
(2000); Bartelsman and Doms (2000); Davis and Haltiwanger (1999); Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and 
Scarpetta, (2004). 
4   These results are drawn from productivity decompositions in which aggregate productivity growth is 
decomposed into different components, commonly called the ‘within effect’ (growth within each 
individual firm), ‘between effect’ (gains in productivity due to expanding market of high productivity 
firms), ‘cross effect’ (gains in productivity from high-productivity growth firms’ expanding shares or 
from low-productivity growth firms’ shrinking shares), ‘entry effect’ (gains in productivity due to 
high-productivity firms entering the market), and ‘exit effect’ (gains in productivity due to low 
productivity firms exiting the market).See Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001) and Bartelsman et 
al. (2004) for details on the decomposition for a sample of industrialized and emerging economies.  tends to be larger in high-tech industries than in low-tech industries (Bartelsman et al. 2004); 
that is to say, where there are greater opportunities for technological adoption and products 
and process innovation entry plays a stronger role in driving aggregate productivity growth.  
 
The significant cross-country and cross-industry differences in the intensity of firm dynamics 
and potential impact on productivity growth motivate our interest in financial development 
and other key institutional and policy factors. In this section, we review briefly some of the 
stylized facts on firm dynamics and highlight key differences across countries and sectors to 
guide us in our theoretical and empirical analyses.  
 
The firm-level indicators 
 
We assess the magnitude and key characteristics of firm dynamics drawing from a 
harmonized firm-level database that covers a sample of industrialized, developing and 
emerging economies.  Given data availability on entry and post-entry growth we use a sample 
of 16 countries, namely Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
the United Kingdom and the United States, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia and Mexico (see Table 1).
5 
 
The key features of the micro-data underlying the analysis are as follows: 
 
•  Unit of observation: Data used in the study refer to the firm as the unit of reference, 
with the exception of Germany where data are only available with reference to 
establishments. More specifically, most of the data used conform to the following 
definition: ``an organizational unit producing goods or services which benefits from a 
certain degree of autonomy in decision-making, especially for the allocation of its 
current resources'' (Eurostat, 1998).
6  
•  Size threshold: While some registers include even single-person businesses (firms 
without employees), others omit firms smaller than a certain size, usually in terms of 
the number of employees (businesses without employees), but sometimes in terms of 
other measures such as sales (as is the case in the data for France). Data used in this 
study exclude single-person businesses. However, because smaller firms tend to have 
more volatile firm dynamics, remaining differences in the threshold across different 
country datasets should be taken into account in the international comparison. 
                                                 
5.   The original sample includes 24 countries.  However, for the three East Asian countries – South 
Korea, Taiwan (China) and Indonesia – data are draw from business censuses and are available only 
every 3-5 years.  This does not allow estimating annual entry rates or post-entry growth. For Brazil 
and Venezuela, the coverage of small firms is limited in the available data, somewhat limiting their 
relevance for the purpose of this paper. For Canada the data is not detailed by size classes. For Latvia 
and Estonia, the number of firms in the economy is too small, which limits the ability to compute 
consistent entry rates for a large number of sectors. Moreover, for these countries we do not have long 
time series (less than 6 years). We checked whether these choices affected entry regressions: a 
sensitivity analysis was conducted including Brazil, Venezuela, Latvia and Estonia and the results for 
entry rates by size classes are similar. Details are available from the authors.    
6  It should be stressed that only in some of the countries in the sample organizational changes, such as 
mergers and acquisitions are fully taken into account. We control for these possible differences across 
countries by including in our empirical analysis a full set of dummy variables controlling for country/ 
size effects.  •  Industry coverage:  National data have been organized along a common industry 
classification (ISIC Rev. 3). In the panel datasets, firms were allocated to the single 
ISIC industry that most closely fit their operations over the complete time-span for 
which the firm is observed.
7 
 
The firm-level data come from business registers (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and the United States, Slovenia and Romania), social security databases 
(France, Germany, Italy, Mexico) or corporate tax rolls (Argentina, France, Hungary), as 
shown in Table 1. Annual industry surveys are generally not the best source for firm 
demographics, due to sampling and reporting issues, but have been used nonetheless for 
Chile, and Colombia. Data for Portugal are drawn from an employment-based register 
containing information on both establishments and firms. All these databases allow firms to 
be tracked over time because addition or removal of firms from the registers reflects the actual 
entry and exit of firms. We define five size classes based on the number of firm employees: 1- 
19 workers, 20-49 workers, 50-99 workers, 100-499, and 500 or more workers. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Firm dynamics and productivity growth 
 
Fact 1: Sizeable firm turnover in all countries  
 
Our data confirm a high firm churning in all countries in the sample. In Figure 1 we present 
entry and exit rates for the total business sector and manufacturing focusing on firms with at 
least 20 to maximize the country coverage.
8  Total firm turnover (entry plus exit rates) 
involves 3-10 per cent of all firms in most industrial countries and more than 10 per cent in 
some of the transition economies for which we have the data.
9  If we also extend the analysis 
to include micro units (1 to 19 employees), we find that between one-fifth and one-fourth of 
all firms are either created or closed-down every year in our sample of countries. There is also 
a high correlation of industry-level entry rates with exit rate in most countries, suggesting that 
firm turnover not only account for the life cycle of different industries – some in the early 
phases of the life cycle and expanding, other in more mature phases that consolidate – but also 
                                                 
7   Following the approach used in Klapper et al. (2006), we excluded some industries from the analysis, 
namely: agriculture and mining, manufacturing n.e.c., electricity, gas and water supply, financial 
intermediation, and community, social and personal services. 
8   The entry rate is defined as the number of new firms divided by the total number of incumbent and 
entrants firms producing in a given year; the exit rate is defined as the number of firms exiting the 
market in a given year divided by the population of origin, i.e. the incumbents in the previous year. 
9    Cross-country comparisons of firm turnover may be affected by differences in the industry 
composition of the different countries. Bartelsman et al. (2004) decompose the effects of sectoral 
composition and within sector differences in firm turnover and find that the variability of turnover 
rates for the same industry across countries is comparable in magnitude to that across industry in each 
country. The importance of industry effects that hold across countries supports our empirical analysis 
that exploits cross-industry variation in the sample of countries to assess the role of financial 
constraints and other regulations.    for a continuous process of reallocation of resources in which new businesses displace 
obsolete units (a point also highlighted by Audretsch, 1995).
10       
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Fact 2: Firm turnover is largely driven by small- and medium-sized businesses  
 
Size is a crucial dimension in the analysis of firm entry and exit.  Not surprisingly, small firms 
(fewer than 20 employees) account for more than 80 percent of total firm turnover and firm 
turnover tend to decline with size. However, this is not completely true for some European 
countries where entry and exit rates tend to decline less steeply as one moves from small to 
larger size classes. This suggests a possible role of the business environment that reduces firm 
dynamics among medium-sized businesses.  
 
In Table 2 we quantify the role that the different dimensions of the data – size, industry and 
country -- play in explaining the overall variance in entry rates. The analysis of variance is 
performed for the unbalanced total economy and the manufacturing sector.
11 It is noticeable 
that technological and market structure characteristics that are reflected in industry-specific 
effects explain only 3.3 per cent of the overall variations in entry rates. Country-specific 
factors explain more of the variation in entry rates than the industry factors, but the dominant 
role is indeed played by the size dimension that alone accounts for about one-third of the total 
variance, while the combined industry*size effects account for more than 40 percent. These 
results clearly indicate the importance of exploiting the size dimension in the analysis of firm 
turnover data. Previous studies that did not differentiate entry rates (or firm turnover) by size 
are likely to have missed an important source of cross-country variation and one that is likely 
to be directly driven by the institutional and policy framework in which firms operate.   
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
 
Fact 3: Market selection is harsh and many new firms exit quickly 
Figure 2 presents non-parametric estimates of survivor rates for firms that entered the market 
in the late 1980s and 1990s in the manufacturing sector of our sample of countries.  The 
survivor rate specifies the proportion of firms from a cohort of entrants that still exist at a 
given age.
12  The Figure suggests that market selection is harsh in all countries. The initial 
years are particularly tough: about 10 to 30 percent of entering firms do not pass the market 
test and are forced out within the first two years of life. Conditional on overcoming the initial 
years, the survival prospect of firms improves: firms that remain in business after the first two 
                                                 
10   In the transition economies, the weaker correlation of entry and exit rates across industries is largely 
due to the systemic changes in which some over-populated industries shrank while others – including 
most business-sectors – expanded.   
11   The total economy sample is unbalanced because it only covers manufacturing industries for the 
United Kingdom, Chile and Colombia 
12   In the figure, the survival rates are averaged over different entry cohorts and do not take into account 
differences in the industry composition across countries.  Bartelsman et al. (2004) also look at the role 
of sectoral composition. Notably we find that the variation across countries is more systematic than 
that across industries.  Across industries, after four years between 60 and 80 percent of firms survive, 
while for example the survival rate in office and computing equipment deviates from 40 percent 
below to 40 percent above the cross-country average of 70 percent. years have a 40 to 80 per cent chance of surviving for five more years.
13 Nevertheless, only 
about 30-50 percent of total entering firms in a given year survive beyond the seventh year in 
most countries.
14  Moreover, for most countries, the rank ordering of survival is similar 
whether using a 2-year, 4-year or 7-year horizon suggesting that there is an important country 
effect that impacts the survival function.
15   
  
FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
Fact 4: Post-entry growth of successful new businesses varies a lot across countries 
 
 If market selection is hard, growth potentials for successful entrants can be great, but strongly 
depend on the business environment in which firms operate. To assess cross country 
differences in post-entry growth, Figure 3 shows the average size of surviving firms at 
different ages compared with that at entry.  It clearly shows significant cross-country 
variations:  for example, successful new firms tend to expand more rapidly in the U.S. than in 
Europe. This is partially due to the larger gap between the size at entry and the average firm 
size of incumbents, i.e. there is a greater scope for expansion amongst young ventures in the 
US markets than in Europe. It can also reflect better business environment conditions that 
allow new firms to enter relatively small and, if successful, expand rapidly to approach the 
minimum efficient scale. This finding suggests that the analysis of firm dynamics and its links 
with financial development and other institutional factors cannot only focus on entry, but 
should also explore the development of new ventures in the first years of their life.      
 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
There are two main facts that clearly emerge from our brief review of firm dynamics in our 
sample of industrialized and emerging economies and that have guided our theoretical and 
empirical analyzes. First, while sizeable every where, firm entry rates vary across countries 
and, especially across size classes within each country. This confirms the importance of 
assessing the possible influence that financial development and other business environment 
conditions exert on them. Second, it clearly indicates large variations in the post entry 
behavior of firms, which can again be influenced by access to credits of new small businesses 
as well as by regulatory conditions.  
 
3.  A simple model 
Basic setup 
 
                                                 
13    These results are consistent with a number of other studies, including (see Evans 1987a, 1987b; 
Dunne et al. 1988, 1989). 
14   Survival rates presented in the Figure are higher in transition economies. New firms in these countries 
populated new areas of business activity (especially in the service sector) and – at least in the initial 
years of the transition period  – were less exposed than their counterparts in industrialized and 
emerging economies to strong competition from either insiders or other outsiders.  
15   However, there are a few interesting exceptions.  The U.S. has relatively low survival rates at the 2-
year horizon but relatively higher survival rates at the 7-year horizon.  This pattern might reflect the 
relatively rapid cleansing of poorly performing firms in the U.S. How can we formalize the links between financial development  –  and other business 
regulations – and entry and post entry growth?  To address this question, we present in this 
section a simple model which draws from Aghion et al. (2006). Consider an economy 
populated by a continuum of overlapping generations of two-period lived individuals. There 
are two types of individuals in the economy, the entrepreneurs and the investors. 
Entrepreneurs differ in their initial production capacity 0 θ  (their size at birth time t) and in 
their potential capacity in the long term  1 θ  (their size at time t+1). Thus, new entrants at time 
t produce in periods t and t+1, and exit the market before time t+2. Initial capacity 0 θ  is 
uniformly distributed between 0 and  0 θ , whereas 1 θ  is uniformly distributed between 0 and 
1 θ .
16 
 
Entrepreneurs can borrow from a large number of investors. We assume that lenders can 
assess the entrepreneurs' initial production 0 θ , which is observable, but not their long-term 
capacity 1 θ . 
 
There are two goods in the economy: a numeraire good which serves as production and entry 
input, and a consumption good. 
 
The life cycle of an entrepreneur born at time t can be described as follows. 
 
¾  At time t (short term): 
 
•  New entrepreneurs decide whether or not to enter the sector that produces the 
consumption good. The entry involves a sunk cost b in units of the numeraire good. If 
they do not enter, their profit is 0. 
 
•  Entrepreneurs who enter the consumption good market produce and sell at the 
equilibrium price that clears the consumption good market at time t. For simplicity we 
normalize production costs at zero.
17 
 
•  Entrepreneurs may then decide to expand capacity for period t+1. By investing I units 
of numeraire good, they can expand their long-term capacity from  1 θ  to 1 ) 1 ( θ αI + . 
 
¾  At time t+1 (long term): 
 
•  Entrepreneurs produce and sell at the equilibrium price that clears the consumption 
good market at that time. We shall focus attention to the stationary equilibrium in 
which the equilibrium price p is the same in all periods, and analyze how a change in 
financial development affects this stationary equilibrium. 
 
Let D(p) denote the aggregate demand for the consumption good at any period. Total supply 
of the consumption good at time t+1 is equal to the sum of the long-term aggregate 
                                                 
16   We do not need to assume that  ) , ( 1 0 θ θ are independently distributed. For example, our results carry 
through if  ηε θ η θ + − = 0 1 ) 1 (  andε is independent from 0 θ .  
17   Moving to the more realistic case with positive labor cost, only involves replacing p by p=p-w instead 
of p in the following analysis. Since w is exogenous, the general case leads to the same conclusions.  production capacity of entrants from time t and of the short-term production capacity of new 
entrants at time t+1. 
 
Credit constraints 
 
Let’s us assume that only short term production 0 θ can be used as collateral. Moreover, 
consider an entrepreneur who wants to invest k units of numeraire at entry and borrows that 
amount from the capital market at time t=0. Ex post, the entrepreneur can choose either to 
repay k or to stall at a cost k τ  proportional to the amount invested and lose the value of its 
collateral 0 θ p . Thus, ex post enforcement requires that: 
 
0 θ τ p k k + <  
 
or 
0 θ μ p k <  
 
where the credit multiplier  ) 1 /( 1 τ μ − =  reflects the level of financial development. In 
particular, entrepreneurs with initial capacity  0 θ  can enter only if: 
 
0 θ μ p b <  
 
where b denotes the entry cost. Then, the maximum amount an entrepreneur may invest in 
long-term capacity expansion is b p − 0 θ μ . 
 
Solving the model 
 
For the sake of exposition, we first rule out the possibility of ex post capacity expansion: that 
is to say, we assume  0 = α . 
 
Entrepreneurs with initial capacity  p b μ θ / 0 <  cannot raise enough cash to pay the entry fee, 
and therefore will not enter the consumption good market no matter their long term 
capacity 1 θ . Note that the cut-off level: 
 
p
b
μ
θ =
*
0  
 
is lower the higher the level of financial development μ  and the higher the equilibrium price 
p on the consumption goods market. 
 
Next, consider an entrepreneur with initial capacity  . If she enters, she will 
make profits in all periods and will not exit. Her net present value upon entry is then equal to: 
p b μ θ θ /
*
0 0 = >
 
b p p − + = Π 1 0 θ δ θ  
 
where δ is the discount factor.  
Normalizing at zero the payoff of an entrepreneur that does not enter the consumption good 
market, an entrepreneur with initial capacity   will enter whenever   or 
equivalently: 
p b μ θ θ /
*
0 0 = > 0 > Π
 
p
b
> + 1 0 θ δ θ  
 
In particular, given  0 θ , the minimal long-term capacity threshold is: 
 
δ
θ
δ
θ
0 *
1 − =
p
b  
 
We can now solve for the equilibrium consumption good price in a stationary 
equilibrium. As we focus on stationary equilibrium, we drop time subscripts. The aggregate 
supply of consumption good is a decreasing function of both capacity thresholds  p b μ /  
and . Thus, it is increasing in p b/ μ , p μ  and p. Let  ) , ( p p S μ  denote the aggregate supply, 
increasing in both arguments. Since aggregate demand D(p) for the consumption good is a 
decreasing function of its price and supply is increasing with price, the equilibrium is 
uniquely determined by: 
 
) , ( ) ( p p S p D μ =  
 
Moreover, since aggregate supply S is increasing with the level of financial developmentμ , 
the equilibrium price p is decreasing withμ . 
 
Finally, since the equilibrium price p is decreasing withμ , we obtain that p μ  is increasing 
withμ  (the appendix provides a formal proof). 
 
It then immediately follows from this discussion that an increase of financial developmentμ  
induces: (i) a decrease of the cut-off entry size , which means that smaller firms can enter; 
(ii) a decrease in the equilibrium price p, and therefore an increase in the capacity 
thresholds , which in turn means that fewer large firms with  will enter; (iii) an 
increase in post-entry growth, because size at entry decreases and long-term size increase (see 
figure 4 for a graphical illustration). 
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What happens when we allow for capacity expansion? In fact, one can show that the analysis 
will remain qualitatively the same as before concerning entry decisions, with the same 
threshold  , as long as
*
1 θ 1 < b α , where α  is the rate of return to capacity growth, except that 
now the long-term capacity expansion  b p − 0 θ μ  also increases. To see this, note that the 
optimal expansion investment I solves 
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In particular firms will expand (i.e I>0), whenever 
 
1 1 > α θ δ p  
 
When 1 < b α , this condition is more stringent than the condition 
 
*
1 1 θ θ >  
 
for profitable entry, which means that there will be a range of firms with  which enter 
but do not expand. A higher
*
1 1 θ θ >
μ  will increase post entry growth for those firms that decide to 
expand, which in turn will contribute to increasing aggregate supply thereby reducing the 
equilibrium price for the consumption good. 
Summarizing the main predictions 
 
The model predicts that an increased level of financial development: (i) will foster entry by 
small firms but discourage entry by those larger firms that do not have the best long term 
prospects; (ii) will foster post entry growth of all entering firms. In the next section we shall 
confront these predictions to the data. 
 
4.  Measurement and estimation method 
The econometric strategy 
 
We test the predictions of our stylized model by exploiting the observed industry/size and 
time variations in the harmonized firm-level database through a difference-in-difference 
approach (see Rajan and Zingales, 1998)
 18. The difference-in-difference approach consists in 
identifying an industry-specific factor that affects the way financial development -- or other 
business regulations -- impact on the decision of firms to enter the market or expand their 
activities in the early years of life.  
 
We assume that industries that depend more heavily on external financing would be more 
affected by a weak financial market. In particular, we use the relative dependence of external 
financing observed in the U.S. industries as the interacting factor for the different indicators 
of financial development. Since the desired amount of external financing in each industry is 
not observed, we can proxy it by using the actual amount of funds raised externally when 
financial markets are sufficiently developed so as to provide firms with un-constrained access 
to external financing.  Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), we assume that the U.S. 
financial markets come closest to provide such access and, accordingly, take US listed firms 
to define the industry-specific need of external finance. Therefore, we assess whether 
industries that depend more heavily on external financing are disproportionately affected by 
weak financial market conditions.  
                                                 
18   The difference-in-difference approach has already been used in a number of empirical studies in the 
corporate literature (e.g., Classens and Laeven, 2003), as well as in the analysis of firm entry (Klapper 
et al. 2004) and in the analysis of job flows (Haltiwanger et al. (2006). We specially thank  Klapper, 
Laeven and Rajan for providing us with the index of dependence in external finance in NACE code.  
In the augmented model, in which we also consider other policy and regulatory variables, we 
interact each of them with a salient industry characteristics, namely labor intensity (or gross 
job flows) for labor regulations and total firm turnover (or the relative value added growth) 
for entry regulations. 
 
The advantage of the difference-in-difference approach compared to standard cross-
country/cross-industry studies is that it allows exploiting within country differences between 
industry cells based on the interaction between country and industry characteristics. Thus, we 
can also control for country and industry effects, thereby minimizing problems of omitted 
variable bias and other misspecifications.  
 
Estimated entry equations  
 
Following our stylized model, we run a set of specifications for the entry and the post-entry 
equations. Our data have four dimensions: (c) country; (i) industry -- 2-digit manufacturing 
and business services; (s) size; and (t) time. In all our specifications, we control for 
country-size effects and industry-size effects due to other market, technological or regulatory 
factors not included in the regressions. Size specific country dummies also control for 
differences in sample thresholds. The measure of entry rate used in the empirical analysis is 
the ratio of the total number of firms that entered the market in a given industry, size class and 
year over the total number of firms in that industry and size class. To control for size effects -- 
within each size class -- we also weight entry rate by employment. 
 
We first regress entry rates on our indicators of financial development, measured in different 
ways, interacted with the indicator of dependence on external financing (ExtDep). We can 
write the equations as follows: 
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In these specifications we examine whether the difference in industry-size entry rates between 
industries with high or low dependence on external financing is smaller in countries with 
better financial markets. Thus, by including the interactions between our variable on financial 
development and the industry-specific characteristic, we can control for unobserved country-
size and industry-size fixed effects. 
 
We then allow for the coefficients of the interactions of our variable on financial development 
and the dependence in external finance to vary by firm size groups. Formally, we estimate the 
equation: t  s, i, c, t
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Last, we control for alternative policy variables interacted with a specific industry factor. We 
consider labor regulations, interacted with an index of job reallocation in US (JobflowsUS, 
gross job flows among US incumbents in the same sector)
19, and start-up regulations, 
interacter with the natural firm turnover (TurnoverUS, measured as average exit and entry rates 
in US sectors) or the relative growth of value added in the US (RdlvaUS). Labeling the 
institutional or regulatory variable as “policy” and the industry-specific factor as “industry 
factor”, this multivariate specification can be written as follows: 
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Post-entry growth equations 
 
Post-entry growth data are available at different time in the life of each new cohort of entrant 
firms. We focus our empirical analysis on the sixth year of life of the new firms. This allows 
capturing the effects of learning by doing by new firms in the initial years of activity, as well 
as market selection. Our post-entry growth variables are: i) the post-entry change in 
employment of surviving firms after six years of activity; and ii) the total change in the 
employment of a cohort after six years. While the former explores the post-entry performance 
of successful firms, the latter includes both the changes in employment of successful firms 
and the job losses of new firms that exit the market in the first six years of activity (we will 
focus on the first measure and analyze the total employment growth in the last section). 
Moreover, we take averages of post-entry growth and total employment changes of different 
cohorts over the period covered by the data. In other words, our indicators vary by country 
and industry level. Formally, our post-entry growth equation can be specified as follows: 
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19    The difference between the 90
th and the 10
th percentile of the ExtDep,  RdlvaUS, JobflowsUS and 
TurnoverUS are respectively 0.90, 6.28, 9.13 and 7.77. A multivariate specification, controlling for labor regulation (interacted with the index of 
gross job flows in US), may be rewritten: 
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Since post-entry growth may simply depend on the size at entry, as shown in the first part of 
the model without investment in capacity expansion, we also examine a specification 
controlling for the average size of cohorts: 
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Last, in order to show that financial development particularly affects entrants and that post-
entry growth is not simply related to the growth of incumbents, we consider the following 
specification: 
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Alternative specifications will be examined in the robustness section. 
 
The indicators of financial development and other regulations   
 
In the empirical analysis we use two traditional (outcome) indicators of the degree of financial 
development, but also consider a set of regulatory variables that affect them. The outcome 
indicators are: i) the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP (from the IMF 
International Financial Statistics); and ii) the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP 
(from Standard and Poor’s and World Bank’s World Development Indicators).
20 We also 
consider a synthetic indicator of financial development defined as the sum of the private credit 
and market capitalization ratios.  
 
The regulatory indicators of banking and securities markets are drawn from difference 
sources.
21 For banking, we focus on regulations that affect competition and we do not 
consider regulations that primarily aim at financial stability with more limited adverse effects 
on competitive pressure. We use four main indices: 
 
•  The share of government assets over total banking assets. In order to have time series 
that refer to the period under analysis, we use the index from Micco, Panizza and 
                                                 
20   See Beck, Levine and Demirgurc-Kunt (2000). 
21   We have followed here the approach proposed by de Serres et al. (2006). Yañez (2004) applying the same method as La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2002).
 22 
 
•  Entry requirements in banking, which measures barriers to the entry of domestic 
firms. The data comes from “Bank, Regulation and Supervision Database” (see Barth, 
Caprio and Levine, 2003). The index gathers information about licensing requirements 
for setting up a bank in each country.
23  
 
•  Barriers to foreign entry. The index is taken from the “Economic Freedom of the 
World (EFW)” database (see Gwartney and Lawson, 2004).  It draws itself from 
different sources: the World Economic Forum (2001); the Global Competitiveness 
Report, 2001-2002; and the Bank, Regulation and Supervision Database (see Barth, 
Caprio and Levine, 2003). It considers both the rate of denial of foreign bank license 
and the share of foreign bank assets in total bank assets. 
 
•  Regulation of bank activity. This index is constructed using the Bank, Regulation and 
Supervision Database (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2003) and measures the regulatory 
restrictiveness for bank participation in securities activity, insurance, real estate and 
ownership of non-financial firms. 
 
Figure 5 shows these regulatory indicators for our sample of countries. It shows significant 
variation across countries with some smaller European countries and the UK and US. 
generally having lower government direct intervention and easier entry conditions than than 
in many emerging economies and larger Continental EU countries.  
 
For securities markets, we consider indices taken from the World Bank Doing Business 
(2006) database and Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2006) (see Figure 6). In particular: 
 
•  Investor protection. Captures the strength of minority shareholder protection against 
directors’ misuse of corporate asset for personal gain from three perspectives: 
transparency of transactions, liability for self-dealing and shareholders’ ability to sue 
directors for misconduct. As emphasized by Perotti and Volpin (2004) and others, the 
level of investor protection is a key indicator of financial development. This index is 
taken from the “Doing Business” database. 
 
•  Creditor rights. This index is from the “Doing Business” database and measures the 
degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate lending. 
 
•  Information sharing. This index measures the presence of public or private registries. 
Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2006), using time series over a long time period, have 
shown that that the presence of public or private registry coverage induces more 
                                                 
22    La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) show that government ownership of banks has a 
negative impact on financial development and growth. For 2002, both indices are correlated at more 
than 85% for all countries or just the country which are covered by our analysis. Moreover, our results 
are robust to using La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) index. 
23   In some studies, barriers to entry in the banking sector are found to negatively affect financial 
development (see e.g. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2003). 
 developed credit markets. Since asymmetric information is a main source of financial 
constraints, information sharing is therefore likely to boost financial development. 
 
•  Contract enforcement. The index is drawn from Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer 
(2006) who show that the time to enforce a debt contract (in log) has a negative and 
significant impact on financial development. 
 
•  Average time to complete bankruptcy procedures (in log). It measures the efficiency 
of bankruptcy laws and its proceedings with respect to the time required to go through 
the bankruptcy procedure. This index is from the “Doing Business” database. 
 
Figure 6 reports these indicators for our sample of countries. Again, it shows wide disparities 
across countries.   
 
We first use a two-stage approach, regressing financial development (either private credit or 
stock market capitalization) on the corresponding set of policy variables and then taking the 
fitted value in the entry and post-entry growth regressions. Because of the small number of 
countries and the potential correlation between our policy variables, we also consider the 
simple average of our indices as a robustness test. In order to put all indices on an equal 
footing, we rescaled them from zero to one, one being the “best performing” country. The 
sensitivity analysis confirms that the use of simple averages of the regulatory indicators 
instead of the fitted values from the financial development regressions does not affect 
significantly our estimated results.  
 
Entry and post entry decisions are also influenced by a host of other factors. In our empirical 
analysis, we consider two key regulatory aspects: regulations affecting start-up costs; and 
regulations affecting the hiring and firing workers.  The former, if enforced, are likely to 
discourage the entry of firms, especially those of small size for which the start up costs may 
account for a significant share of the overall project costs.  Likewise, employment protection 
legislation, by raising labor adjustment costs, is likely to affect the decision to enter the 
market, but also the optimal strategy of size at entry and post entry expansion once the 
response of the market in known. In this paper we consider two indicators from “Economic 
Freedom of the World (EFW)” summarizing the stringency of regulations affecting start ups 
and labor adjustment. In particular: 
 
•  Regulations affecting start-up costs. The indicator considers the cost and procedural 
inconveniences to set up a new business. The original indicator from EFW was 
rescaled from 0 to 1 with 1 being the most restrictive. 
 
•  Employment protection legislation. We use a synthetic indicator of hiring and firing 
restrictions rescaled from 0 to 1, with 1 being the most restrictive.
24 
 
The main advantage of the EFW regulatory indicators compared to others available in the 
literature is their time dimension and country coverage.  Indeed, other indicators are either 
available for all countries but at one point in time only (e.g., indicators from the World Bank 
                                                 
24   This synthetic indicator of EPL is highly correlated with another indicator available only for the 
OECD countries and that arguably offers a more comprehensive coverage of regulatory aspects 
affecting the hiring and firing process (see OECD, Employment Outlook, 2003).  The correlation 
between the two indicators for the OECD sample is 0.85, statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Doing Business database that are available only for the 2000s),
25 or available over time but 
only for a subset of the countries covered in our study (e.g. the OECD regulatory indicators).  
Since most of the countries included in our analysis have experienced significant regulatory 
reforms since the period covered by our entry and post-entry growth data, the time dimension 
of the EFW was of primary importance.  It should also be stressed that the cross-country 
correlations of the EFW indicators with others available in the literature is generally very high 
(see Table 3 for details on the regulatory variables).  
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
5.  Empirical results 
Average impact on entry 
 
We look first at the average impact of financial development without differentiating by size, 
as it has been done in previous empirical studies. Table 4 presents our results. In column (1) 
we interact the index on financial development with the index of external financial 
dependence. The coefficient is estimated using all size categories. It is positive and 
significant, suggesting that entry rates are, ceteris paribus, larger in industries with greater 
dependence on external financing in countries with more developed financial markets. Note 
that FD is an index of financial development that takes both private credit and stock market 
capitalization into account. In columns (2) and (3) we consider each component in turn. The 
coefficients are significant and positive for both indices. These results are similar to Klapper, 
Leaven and Rajan (2006), who also find a positive and significant impact of financial 
development (private credit interacted with the dependence in external finance) on entry rates. 
It is also coherent with previous studies finding a positive impact on net entry rates (including 
Rajan and Zingales 1998). 
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
How sizeable is the estimated impact of financial development on entry rates? Given our 
estimation approach, we consider the effect of financial development in reducing entry rates 
between two industries at the extremes of the distribution of industry by the degree of 
dependence on external financing. Using the coefficient of the interaction terms, we estimate 
the difference in entry rates between industries with a high dependence on external financing 
(90
th percentile of distribution in the United States) and industries with a low dependence 
(10
th percentile of the same distribution) in a country with the highest index of financial 
development compared to the country with the lowest index, as follows: 
 
)] )( [( min max 10 90 FD FD ExtDep ExtDep th th − − β  
 
where β is the estimated coefficient, ExtDep and FD are the dependence on external financing 
and the indicator of financial development, respectively. From our result from column (1), the 
impact of financial development on entry rates (weighted by employment) is then 1.3 
percentage points– i.e. 26 percent of the observed sample mean. If we consider private credit 
and stock market capitalization separately, we estimate an impact of 1.4 and 1.1 respectively. 
                                                 
25   Using Doing Business indices on entry costs broadly yields the same results and does not affect 
coefficients for financial development. This average effect of financial development on entry across size categories may not look 
particularly strong. However, as we shall see in the next subsection, the effect becomes much 
larger once we differentiate firm entry rates by size. 
Effects on entry by size categories 
 
As stressed in Section 2, entry rates vary significantly across firm size within each country, 
and the predictions of our model is that regulations and financial development may impact 
very differently entrants with different size. In particular, according to prediction (1) and (2) 
of the model, we expect a positive impact of financial development on entry of small firms 
and a negative impact on the entry of large firms. To test for these predictions, we relax the 
hypothesis of common coefficient of the interactions and allow them to vary by size classes. 
As in the previous case, we allow for country-size and industry-size fixed effects. In other 
words, all parameters are size specific. 
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
In column (1) of Table 5, the coefficient for the interaction between financial development 
and external dependence is positive and significant for very small (1 to 19 employees) and 
small (20 to 49 employees) firms and becomes even negative for larger firms (100 to 499 
employees or more than 500 employees). In other words, financial development boosts entry 
among small firms in sectors depending more on external finance but may even curb entry 
among very large firms. As we can see in columns (2) and (3), these effects are robust across 
different measures of financial development, namely private credit and stock market 
capitalization. Interacted with external financial dependence, the impact on small firms is 
large and positive for both and becomes negative for larger firms. The positive effect on small 
firms and the negative effect on large firms seem slightly stronger for private credit.  
 
These results are based on outcome variables of financial development. Since our primary 
interest is the potential impact of policies, we need to assess the robustness of these results 
using regulatory factors that affect the estimated overall degree of development of financial 
markets.. In column (4), we instrument private credit with regulatory variables that are likely 
to have an impact on the banking system. As we mentioned in section 3, we consider four 
main policy variables for banking regulation: the share of assets owned by the government 
over total bank assets, barriers to the entry of foreign banks, entry requirements and the 
regulation of banking activity. The results are very similar. In column (5), we instrument 
stock market capitalization by contract enforcement, creditor rights, public or private 
registries, investor protection and bankruptcy procedures. We obtain coefficients that are even 
larger than without instrumentation, being higher for small firms and more negative for large 
firms. In columns (6) and (7), we directly regress entry rates on these regulatory and policy 
variables. We compute the simple average of respective policy variables for credit or stock 
market, each sub-index being normalized (0 for the “worst” country and 1 being the best” 
country
26). Again, we find positive and significant coefficients for very small and small firms 
for both sets of variables. 
 
TABLE 6 HERE 
                                                 
26   The difference between the maximum and the minimum of simple averages across countries is larger 
than 0.6 for both sets of variables. Note that similar results (but somewhat less significant for market) 
are obtained using the first principal component of each set of variables.  
In Table 6, we check the robustness of previous results (focusing on instrumented measures of 
financial development) while controlling for other policy variables, namely labor market 
regulation and entry costs, which are expected to have a negative impact on entry rates. Each 
of these policy variables is interacted with specific industry factors. In column (1), we control 
for employment protection legislation (EPL) interacted with the intensity of job flows in US. 
We find negative coefficients for EPL, that is to say, labor market regulation has a negative 
impact on entry rates in sectors characterized by larger job flows, i.e. where the EPL-induced 
overall costs of adjustment are higher given the stronger requirement to adapt the workforce 
to changes in demand.
27 Although the impact of EPL is negative and significant for most size 
categories, the estimated impact of private credit (instrumented by policy variables) is still 
significant for small firms and slightly larger than before. Similarly, in column (2), where the 
effect of stock market (instrumented) is estimated along with EPL, results are similar if not 
even larger than without EPL. We also control for entry costs. In columns (3) and (4), we 
interact entry costs with firm turnover rates in US, following Fisman Allende (2004) and 
Klapper, Leaven and Rajan (2006). Surprisingly, we find non significant coefficients for entry 
costs.
28 However, the impact of private credit and stock market (instrumented) is as large as 
previously estimated. In columns (5) and (6), entry costs are interacted with the growth 
potentials of the industry, proxied by the growth of value added in each US industry relative 
to the overall average. The estimated coefficients for entry cost are now negative but 
coefficients for financial development still hold (coefficients small firms are stronger and 
coefficients for very small firms are weaker). 
 
Quantitatively, the difference of the impact of financial development between small and large 
firms is quite sensible. If we multiply the coefficients by the difference between the 90th and 
the 10th percentile of the industry factor and the difference between the highest and the lowest 
value of the country variable, we find that the impact of private credit on very small firms 
rises to 3.6 whereas the impact on large firms drops to -2. It yields a differential impact of 
more than 5 percentage points. This effect is quite large compared to the mean entry rate in 
our sample, which ranges from 2.0% among the largest firms (500+) to 9.4% among the 
smallest (<20 employees). Independently, the impact of private credit on small firms seems 
larger than stock market but it becomes smaller once we control for EPL or entry costs. The 
Labor regulations also have a sizeable and comparable impact to that of financial 
development: the difference in firm entry between industries with a high job flexibility 
requirement and those with a low flexibility requirement will be 3.3 percentage points lower 
in a country with the highest index of EPL compared to the United States, the country with 
the least restrictive regulations. However, these policy variables do not seem to affect firms of 
different size differently, a feature that however characterizes clearly financial development.  
 
All results presented in this section provide strong support to the predictions of our stylized 
model on entry. First, financial development has a strong positive impact on firm entry. 
Second, the effect is stronger for small firms and in sectors with greater dependence on 
external financing. For large firms, as indicated in the model, financial development may even 
                                                 
27  These results are consistent with those of Haltiwanger, Scarpetta and Schweiger (2006) who look at 
the impact of employment protection legislation on job flows using the same database.   
28   This absence of negative coefficient is not sensible to the set of countries (except US), specifications, 
and measures of entry costs or firm turnover. Note that we drop the US from the regressions while 
using interactions with turnover in US, job flows in US and growth of value added in US, because 
these indices are strongly correlated with entry rates in US. Including US into the regressions with 
entry costs yields negative coefficients, but the coefficients for financial development still hold. deter entry of new firms. Third, these results are robust to the inclusion in the regressions of 
other regulatory factors that also influence the decision to enter the market. In particular, 
employment protection legislation, by raising adjustment costs of new firms, tends to reduce 
entry rates mainly in those sectors that are characterized by more volatility in employment. 
Similarly, there is only tentative evidence in our data that start-up costs affect negatively entry 
rates in dynamic sectors, ceteris paribus. 
Post-entry growth 
 
We now check the third prediction of our model, namely that financial development should 
promote post-entry growth, even after controlling for the initial size at entry. In Table 7, we 
present the results of our regressions with interactions of the indices of financial development 
with the dependence in external finance. 
 
TABLE 7 HERE 
 
In column (1), (2) and (3), the coefficients for financial development (the overall index, 
private credit over GDP and stock market capitalization over GDP, respectively) are all 
positive and significant. In other words, financial development promotes post-entry growth in 
sectors with higher dependence in external finance. Here the effect of stock market seems to 
dominate. 
 
As previously, we also consider the impact of different policy variables that are likely to 
affect either banking or financial markets. In column (4), we instrument private credit by the 
share of government assets over total bank assets, barriers to the entry of foreign banks, entry 
requirements and the regulation of banking activity. In column (5), we instrument stock 
market capitalization by contract enforcement, creditor rights, public or private registries, 
investor protection and bankruptcy procedures. In both cases, the instrumentation yields better 
results in term of magnitude or significance. Again, effects of stock market and private credit 
are not statistically different if we multiply each coefficient by the variations of the 
component of the respective index of financial development as predicted by policy variables. 
Finally, coefficients are also positive and significant if we take the simple average of the 
respective set of policy variables (columns 6 and 7 of table 4). 
 
TABLE 8 HERE 
 
In table 8, we first examine whether the impact of financial development holds if we control 
for employment protection legislation (EPL) interacted with the intensity of job flows in the  
US industries (columns 1 and 2). We find an insignificant coefficient for EPL, while the 
coefficients of both private credit and stock market remain statistically significant. The next 
two columns (3 and 4) examine whether the positive impact of financial development holds if 
we control for the size at entry. As the model suggests (as soon as the initial and long term 
capacities are not perfectly correlated),
29 post-entry growth should be larger for smaller 
entrants. Indeed, we find a strong, negative and significant for the size at entry. The 
coefficient for financial development, either credit or stock market, is slightly lower but still 
positive and significant.  
 
                                                 
29  However, the fact that smaller firms grow faster than large firms is not particular to models with 
financial constraints (see for example Rossi-Hansberg and Wright 2006). Last but not least, we need to assess whether financial development has a particular impact on 
entrants compared to incumbents. Unfortunately, the data does not allow following firms 
other than entrants over time. Nevertheless our data allow estimating the evolution in the 
average size of incumbent firms over time.
30 Including this additional explanatory variable in 
our post-entry growth regression (Columns 5 and 6) does not affect significantly the 
coefficients for financial development. 
 
Quantitatively, the impact of private credit and stock market capitalization on post-entry 
growth is sizeable. Using the same procedure discussed above for entry rates, we estimate the 
difference between industries with a high dependence on external financing (90
th percentile of 
distribution in the United States) and industries with a low dependence (10
th percentile of the 
same distribution) in a country with the highest index of financial development compared to 
the country with the lowest index. For private credit, we estimate that the effect will be 
around 36 percentage points compared to 43 percentage points for the effect of stock market 
capitalization.  
 
These results provide strong support to the third prediction of our model. Financial 
development not only promotes the entry of new firms, but also the post-entry growth of 
successful firms, especially in those industries that depend more of external financing. 
Moreover, we find that post-entry growth is larger for cohorts with lower average size at entry 
and that, controlling by average size at entry, the positive impact of financial development is 
still positive and significant. 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
 
This section investigates the robustness of our results along different dimensions. Concerning 
entry, we first check the sensitivity of the results to the set of countries and additional 
controls, namely the share of employment of incumbents in the same industry/size cell within 
each country or the growth of the value added in the industry. We then analyze the impact of 
financial development according to the growth potential of the industry, interacting policy 
variables with the relative growth rate of the sector in the United States. 
 
For the post-entry growth analysis, we compare our results with those referring to the average 
growth rate of incumbent firms. Indeed, we show that the impact of financial development on 
incumbent size growth is much weaker in term of amplitude or statistical significance than 
that on the growth of new firms. We also consider different durations for the analysis of 
post-entry growth and look at total employment changes of each cohort, instead of the growth 
of only surviving firms to account for survival and growth.  
 
Sensitivity to the set of countries and sectors 
 
                                                 
30  The data on entry permits to distinguish between three categories of firms (in addition to the size 
category, year, industry and country): entering, exiting and continuing firms. The number of exiting 
firms plus continuing firms at date t is equal to the number of entering plus continuing firms at data t-
1. The ratio of employment among these two groups of firms allows computing the growth in the 
average size of incumbent firms. In the empirical analysis, we control for country, industry and size effects, as well as for 
unobservable effects using a difference-in-difference approach. Moreover, we test the 
robustness of results using alternative measures of financial development and including 
various controls. However, the use of quasi panel data may still run the risk that results are 
driven by the inclusion of a specific country or industry in the sample that drives the results in 
a given direction. 
 
To test for the robustness of results to changes in the sample, we re-estimate the most 
synthetic specification - columns (1) in Table 5 - removing one country or one industry at a 
time from the sample. Figures 7 and 8 present the estimated coefficients on financial 
development (sum of private credit and stock market) interacted with the dependence in 
external finance, differentiated by size classes. 
 
The first set of results (figure 7) shows that the amplitude of our coefficient is quite sensible 
to the inclusion of US into the sample but, surprisingly, dropping the US actually amplifies 
the differences across size categories, which means that the coefficient for small firms 
(between 20 and 50 employees) increases and the coefficient for large firms decreases.  
 
Figure 8 plots the sensitivity of the estimated coefficients of financial development to changes 
in the industry set. Removing one industry at the time does not lead to any major change in 
the estimated coefficients with the only exception of the R&D sector, which is indeed the 
sector with the maximum value of external financial dependence. The main effect is to 
increase the standard deviation of the estimated coefficient, given that we reduce the variance 
of the interaction term. However, the coefficient remains positive and significant (at 5% level) 
for small and very small firms, lower and insignificant for larger firms. 
 
FIGURE 7 HERE 
FIGURE 8 HERE 
 
Additional controls 
 
Several studies (e.g. Rajan and Zingales 1998; Klapper et al., 2006) include the share of the 
industry in the total economy for each country in order to control for potential convergence 
effects across industries in a given country. To test for this hypothesis, we include in our entry 
regressions the share of employment of incumbents in each industry / size cell relative to the 
total employment of incumbents in the country. As expected, the corresponding coefficient is 
negative and significant, but does not affect the coefficients for financial development (see 
columns 1 and 2 in Table 9). If we compute the share of employment for the overall industry, 
instead of each industry /size cell, the resulting coefficient is negative but not significant and 
the coefficients for financial development still hold.  
 
Similarly, in columns (3) and (4) we include the relative growth rate of value added of the 
industry to control for differences in growth opportunities (across years, countries and 
industries) that could directly affect entry rates. The coefficient for the control is slightly 
positive and coefficients for financial development hold. It shows that our results are not 
driven by the possibility that countries that are closer to the U.S. have higher growth 
opportunities in sectors that are more dynamic in the U.S. and more dependent in external 
finance. 
 TABLE 9 HERE 
Interaction with the potential growth of the sector 
 
As a robustness check for the choice of the industry factor, we consider interaction of indices 
of financial development with the growth potential of each industry, measured by the value 
added growth of each industry relative to the average in the U.S. (as in Perotti and Volpin 
2004). Under the assumption that the United States are at the frontier in many sectors and are 
characterized by limited regulations that affect entry and post entry growth, this interacting 
factor should proxy for the technological and market driven potentials of the sector in the 
absence of policy-induced frictions. We drop observations for the US from the regressions. As 
shown in columns (5) and (6) of Table 6, we obtain positive and significant coefficients of 
financial development for small firms, that is to say, financial development boosts the entry 
by small firms in sectors with higher growth potentials.
31 The coefficients for larger firms are 
slightly negative but not significant. These regressions complement and support the 
robustness of our findings by interacting financial development and the dependence in 
external finance. 
Impact of financial development on incumbent size growth 
 
As mentioned in the result section on post-entry growth, the data does not allow following 
incumbents during 6 years and directly comparing the growth of entrants versus incumbents. 
This would have been the simplest way to assess whether financial development has a higher 
impact on entrants compared to incumbents. However, we can compute the growth of the 
average size of all surviving firms from one year to another. In columns (1) and (2) (Table 10) 
we show that financial development has only a weak and non significant effect on the average 
size growth. Even if we multiply this coefficient by 6 (post-entry growth is measured after 6 
years), the estimated effect is much weaker than for entrants
32. These results support a 
stronger impact of financial development on entrants compared to incumbents and 
complement the results from columns (5) and (6) in table 5 where incumbent size growth is 
just a control. 
 
TABLE 10 HERE 
Post-entry growth after different durations 
 
As stressed above, we are interested in assessing the role of financial development on post 
entry growth once we allow for natural learning by doing and market selection. As a 
robustness check, we consider shorter duration periods. This allows considering cohorts of 
larger size but also implies using potentially more noisy data, as these cohorts still include 
firms in the early stages of life with strong learning by doing. In columns (3) and (4) of table 
7, we show that our results hold if we look at post-entry growth after 5 years. However, the 
impact of financial development is less significant if look at post-entry growth after 3 years 
(columns 5 and 6) or less. According to the model, it suggests that the long-term capacity and 
                                                 
31   Similar but less significant results are found if financial development is interacted with entry rates in 
US in the same sector, (see Klapper, et al. 2006 for a similar approach). 
32   Alternatively we regressed the difference of growth (in log) of entrants after 6 years and the size 
growth (in log, or log multiplied by 6) of all firms from year to year. We still find a positive and 
significant coefficient for financial development. the effect of investment in expansion are revealed after several years only. We also checked 
whether our results hold if we look at post-entry growth after 7 years, at the cost of reducing 
the number of countries in the regressions (cohorts in some countries are not documented 
after more than 6 years). The resulting coefficients for financial development are robust also 
in this case. 
Accounting for survival: total employment growth 
 
Last but not least, we analyze the impact of policy variables on the total employment growth 
of cohorts instead of the growth of the size of surviving firms. In columns (7) and (8) in table 
7, we reproduce the regressions on financial development using the total employment growth 
of the cohort instead of the growth of the size of surviving firms. Our coefficients for financial 
development interacted with dependence in external finance are still positive and significant. 
It supports the idea that selection occurs at least partially before entry, as described in the 
model, or that the effect investment in post-entry expansion dominates. 
 
6.  Conclusions and policy considerations 
 
In this paper, we used a harmonized firm-level database to assess the role of financial 
development on firm entry, the size at entry and post entry performance of new firms. We 
implemented a difference-in-difference approach in which we test whether those industries 
with greater dependence on external financing experience greater firm dynamism in countries 
with more developed financial markets. We proxy financial development with outcomes 
measures (private credit and stock market capitalization) but also instrument them with 
regulatory indicators of banking and securities markets. Since entry and post-entry growth of 
new firms are likely to depend on a host of other factors, in our empirical analysis we also 
consider start-up regulations and employment protection legislation that, by raising entry 
costs or labor adjustment costs, may discourage entry and post-entry growth.  
 
A first finding of our empirical analysis is that finance matters most for the entry of small 
firms, especially in sectors that are more dependent upon external finance. This should not 
come as a big surprise: small firms are those who face the largest financial constraints, as 
discussed in several papers (e.g. by Bernanke and Gertler, 1990, World Bank, 2005).  But our 
findings also imply that finance helps improve the selection process by allowing small firms 
to compete on a more equal footing with large firms. More finance permits small firms to take 
advantage of growth opportunities especially in growing sectors where large firms would be 
predominant otherwise. Higher entry in turn can be shown to be growth-enhancing, as 
entrants can force inefficient incumbents to exit or force efficient ones to innovate (see 
Aghion et al., 2006). 
 
A  second finding is that financial development improves post-entry growth of firms. Of 
course, one might argue that higher post-entry growth mainly reflects a better selection at 
entry and the improved access to credit for smaller entrants. However, we saw that the 
positive impact of financial development on post-entry growth holds if we try to control for 
the size of entrants. 
 
A third finding is that our results are robust to the inclusions of other regulations that may 
also affect entry and post-entry growth. While there is evidence that stringent employment protection legislation affects the entry of firms in more volatile sectors, the impact of this 
legislation on post entry growth is not clear cut.  
 
Fourth, while our results suggest that both private credit and stock market capitalization are 
important for promoting entry, the latter plays a stronger role for post-entry growth. This 
result is consistent with the view that market-based financing has a crucial role for boosting 
investment in capacity expansion. Indeed several studies have stressed the in bank-based 
systems the links between lenders and small borrowers tend to be weaker and potentially less 
effective especially in the case of innovative start-ups.
33 While the development of stock 
markets depends on the level of development of the country, several studies have also 
highlighted the significant role of legal systems (civil vs. common law) as well as other 
factors that are more amenable to policy interventions, such as accounting standards and 
regulations (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999).  
 
Based on our findings, a main policy indication is that many countries, including those in 
Continental Europe, should probably make further progress in improving their financial 
markets, so as to boost aggregate entry, and particularly the entry of small firms, to better 
select the best projects, and to promote post-entry growth of successful new firms. Other 
regulations also have an impact on entry and on specific sectors (e.g. highly volatile sectors in 
the case of employment protection) but seem to have a weaker role in driving post entry 
growth. Further promoting financial reforms aimed at fostering competition while maintaining 
stability objectives may have strong overall effects on growth performance, without 
necessarily facing the strong opposition as in the case of, for example, reforms in labor 
regulations. 
 
Our empirical results provide only tentative indications of the direction of further reforms in 
financial markets and it is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper to provide any specific 
policy recommendation. However, drawing from available summary indicators of regulations 
in banking and securities markets, there is clear evidence that there is a long way to go in 
several countries. Many of them have undertaken significant deregulations over the past 
decade, and improvements in information and communication technologies have raised 
competitive pressures in most segments of financial markets. Nevertheless, there remain 
significant differences in the stringency of regulations, even across the OECD countries in our 
sample.  These differences are likely to affect the degree of competition in the banking sector 
and securities markets and raise the costs and choices for both savers and users of external 
finance.  
 
Our results also suggest that in several ways, stock market capitalization and equity play an 
important role, especially in term of post-entry growth. And here the gap between the U.S., 
the U.K. and some Nordic countries on the one hand, and many Continental E.U. countries 
                                                 
33   Stein (2002), for example, has argued that the difficulty to lend effectively to small borrowers is in the 
nature of being a bank. The tendency for banks to be large increases the distance between the owners 
and the loan officers who deal with small borrowers. And, to minimize risks, large banks tend to 
restrict the discretion of the loan officers (i.e. by making rules based on easily measured 
characteristics of the borrower). This, he argues, while covering the bank, may make the lending to 
small firms more difficult and less effective. A recent survey conducted by the OECD also finds no 
strong evidence of a “financing gap” for SME. But lack of appropriate financing is a hindrance to the 
expansion of the innovative SMEs, i.e. firms in technology sectors, with new business models and 
high growth prospects. Traditional bank finance may be of little relevance for these firms, as they 
have untried business models and high risk. (see OECD, 2006).       and emerging economies tends to be considerable. In 2003, for example, stock market 
capitalization over GDP was equal to 0.64 for EU 15 versus 1.17 for the U.S..  Moreover, 
evidence that financial constraints is especially high for new (small) entrants who may have 
limited means of internal finance has led to policy programs targeting fiscal support directly 
at small firms, and also to measures designed to encourage the development of venture capital 
markets. However, there are still major differences in venture capital investment across the 
OECD countries. For example, venture capital investment accounts for slightly less than 0.5 
percent of GDP in the U.S. but by less than 0.15 percent in Germany, France, Spain or Italy.  
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Oxford Univ. Press. Appendix: Impact of financial development on price and size 
 
 
Let  ) , ( p p S μ  denote the aggregated supply of the consumption good at price p given the 
level of financial development µ. Supply at time t is equal to the sum of initial capacity of 
firms that entered at time t  and the long-term capacity of firms that entered at time t-1, 
accounting for capacity expansion (as soon as  0 > α ): 
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Both terms are increasing with p and µp. Given µ, the equilibrium price p
* is the unique 
solution of the equation: 
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Since the right-hand-side is increasing in µ, we immediately get that the overall supply is 
increasing in µ, that the equilibrium price p
* = p
*(µ) is decreasing in µ. In turn, combining 
these two facts leads to the conclusion that pµ is necessarily increasing in µ. More precisely: 
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(the lower is the demand elasticity the stronger is the impact of financial development on 
prices) and: 
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which means that the initial size threshold is unambiguously decreasing with µ.Figure 1: 
 
Firm turnover rates in broad sectors, 1990s 
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B:  Manufacturing, firms with 20 or more employees 
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Source:  Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta, 2004.   
 Figure 2:  
Firm survival in manufacturing at different lifetimes, 1990s 
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Source:  Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta, 2004. 
 
Figure 3:  
Post-entry growth of successful firms  
(Average firm size relative to entry, by age)  
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Source:  Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta, 2004. 
  
Figure 4:  
 
 
Impact of an increase of µ (index of financial development) on the composition of entry 
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 Figure 5: Indices on credit and banking regulations 
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All indices have been rescaled from zero to one, one being for the “best performing” country.  
 Sources: Share of government assets (Micco, Panizza and Yanez 2004); Barriers to banking competition 
(Gwartney and Lawson, 2004); Entry requirements and regulation of activity (Beck, Caprio and Levine, 2006). Figure 6: Security markets regulations indices  
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All indices have been rescaled from zero to one, one being for the “best performing” country.  
Sources: Creditor rights, investor protection, bankruptcy procedures (World Bank: Doing Business database); 
Public or private registries, contract enforcement (Djankov, MacLiesh and Shleifer 2006).  Figure 7: Sensitivity analysis: Estimated coefficient (and 95-5% confidence intervals) for 
financial development interacted with the index of dependence in external finance, by size 
(columns 1 of table 5), excluding one country at a time. 
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Size > 500
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GFigure 8: Sensitivity analysis: Estimated coefficient (and 95-5% confidence intervals) for 
financial development interacted with the index of dependence in external finance, by size 
(columns 1 of table 5), excluding one sector at a time. 
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[ISIC Rev.3  sectors used in our analysis: 5 Food - 6 Textiles - 7 Wood - 8 Paper - 11 Petroleum - 12 Chemicals - 15 Plastics - 16 Other 
non-metallic - 20 Basic metals - 21 Metal products - 23 Machinery - 25 Office - 26 Electrical - 27 Radio TV - 28 Precision - 30 Motor 
vehicles - 31 Other - 37 Construction - 41 Trade and repairs - 42 Hotels and restaurants - 44 Transport - 45 Post and telecom - 50 Related to 
financial intermediation - 52 Real estate - 53 Renting - 54 Computer - 55 R&D - 56 Other business]  
Table 1 - Data sources
Country Source Period* Sectors
Availability of 
survival data
Threshold
Denmark Business register 89-94 All sectors no emp ≥ 1
France Fiscal database 90-97 All sectors yes
Turnover: Man: 0.58M€ 
Serv: 0.17M€
Italy Social security 89-94 All sectors yes emp ≥ 1
Netherlands Business register 89-97 All sectors no none
Finland Business register 89-98 All sectors yes emp ≥ 1
Germany (West) Social security 89-99
All but civil service, 
self employed
yes emp ≥ 1
Portugal Employment-based register 89-98
All but public 
administration
yes emp ≥ 1
UK Business register 89-98 Manufacturing yes emp ≥ 1
USA Business register 89-97 Private businesses yes emp ≥ 1
Chile Annual Industry Survey (ENIA) 89-99 Manufacturing yes emp ≥ 10
Colombia
Annual Manufacturing survey 
(EAM)
89-98 Manufacturing yes emp ≥ 10
Mexico Social security 89-99 All sectors yes emp ≥ 1
Slovenia Business register 96-99 All sectors yes emp ≥ 1
Hungary Fiscal register (APEH) 96-99 All sectors yes emp ≥ 1
Romania Business register 96-99 All sectors yes emp ≥ 1
Argentina
Register, based on Integrated 
System of Pensions
95-99 All sectors yes emp ≥ 1
* We only consider entry rates after 1996 for transition countries. For survival data, the time coverage may differ for some countries  
 
Table 2: Entry rates, analysis of variance 
  Total economy  Total manufacturing 
Industry effects  3.3% 0.4%
Country effects  6.5% 8.5%
Size effects  36.7% 33.6%
Industry*size effects  43.2% 34.7%
Notes: Adjusted R-squared of fixed effects regressions on average (employment-
weighted) entry rates over the 1990s. 
Sources: Authors’ calculation. 
 Table 3: Country variables (used for entry regressions
*) 
Country  Financial 
development 
Private 
Credit 
Stock 
Market 
Employment 
protection  
legislation 
Cost of 
Entry 
Denmark 0 ,73 0,43 0,30 0,52 0,37
France 1,22 0,91  0,31 0,66 0,66
Italy 0,70 0,56  0,14 0,65 0,59
Netherlands 2,36 1,57  0,79 0,59 0,25
Finland 1,04 0,76  0,28 0,65 0,15
Germany 1,29 1,00  0,29 0,64 0,50
Portugal 0,83 0,64  0,20 0,54 0,57
UK 2,26 1,11  1,15 0,28 0,19
USA 1,80 1,08  0,71 0,25 0,16
Chile 1,27 0,54  0,73 0,47 0,35
Colombia 0,37 0,26 0,11 0,52 0,74
Mexico 0,51 0,22  0,29 0,37 0,58
Slovenia 0,34 0,27  0,07 0,64 0,43
Hungary 0,46 0,22  0,23 0,44 0,26
Romania 0,10 0,08  0,01 0,37 0,64
Argentina 0,40 0,22 0,18 0,41 0,38
Mean 0,98 0,62 0,36 0,50 0,43
Standard deviation  0,68 0,42 0,31 0,14 0,19
Notes:For post-entry growth regressions, the time coverage may differ for some countries; therefore, the 
averages of reported indicators of financial development are slightly different. 
 
Sources: Authors’calculation. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Entry rate regressions, average impact of financial development
(1) (2) (3)
FD 0.625
  * ExtDep [0.231]***
Credit 1.068
  * ExtDep [0.385]***
Stock 1.048
  * ExtDep [0.514]**
Observations 10169 10169 10169
R-squared 0.31 0.31 0.31
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Entry rate
OLS regressions; robust standard errors in brackets; year dummies, size specific 
country and industry dummies; clusters by country/industry;
Variables of financial development: (1) "FD": sum of credit and stock; (2) "Credit": 
domestic credit to private sector over GDP; (3) "Stock": stock market capitalization 
over GDP; 
Interactions with the dependence in external finance (source: Klapper et al. 2006)
 
 
 Table 5. Entry rate regressions, impact of financial development by size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FD 1.461
  * ExtDep * s1 [0.447]***
FD 0.887
  * ExtDep * s2 [0.455]*
FD 0.194
  * ExtDep * s3 [0.485]
FD 0.364
  * ExtDep * s4 [0.448]
FD -0.642
  * ExtDep * s5 [0.484]
Credit 2.679 2.525 3.574
  * ExtDep * s1 [0.757]*** [0.942]*** [1.872]*
Credit 1.339 1.871 3.842
  * ExtDep * s2 [0.644]** [0.991]* [1.262]***
Credit 0.618 0.646 1.960
  * ExtDep * s3 [0.770] [0.942] [1.987]
Credit 0.404 -0.324 0.843
  * ExtDep * s4 [0.754] [0.819] [1.649]
Credit -1.480 -1.126 -2.748
  * ExtDep * s5 [0.779]* [0.925] [2.280]
Stock 2.064 2.731 4.521
  * ExtDep * s1 [0.994]** [1.366]** [1.897]**
Stock 1.881 2.030 2.942
  * ExtDep * s2 [1.091]* [1.144]* [1.704]*
Stock -0.423 0.156 1.240
  * ExtDep * s3 [1.240] [1.185] [1.855]
Stock 1.118 0.424 1.790
  * ExtDep * s4 [1.000] [1.063] [1.608]
Stock -0.228 -0.719 -2.240
  * ExtDep * s5 [1.254] [1.175] [1.813]
Measures of financial 
development:
Observations 10169 10169 10169 10169 10169 10169 10169
R-squared 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
Interactions with the dependence in external finance (source: Klapper Leaven Rajan, 2006)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Variables of financial development: (1) "FD": sum of credit and stock; (2) "Credit": domestic credit to private sector over GDP; (3) 
"Stock": stock market capitalization over GDP; (4) Credit instrumented by the share of governement banks, barriers to foreign entry in 
banking, entry requirements, regulation of banking activity; (5) Stock instrumented by contract enforcement, creditor rights, private or 
public registries, investor protection, bankrupty procedures; (6) Simple average of Credit sub-indices; (7) Simple average of Stock sub-
indices
OLS regressions; robust standard errors in brackets; year dummies, size specific country and industry dummies; clusters by 
country/industry;
Entry rate
Outcome variables (private credit or stock 
market over GDP)
Instrumented by policy 
variables
Simple average of policy 
variables
 
 
 Table 6. Entry rate regressions, controlling for other policy variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Credit 2.692 2.543 2.864
  * ExtDep * s1 [1.063]** [1.059]** [1.994]
Credit 2.344 2.036 4.136
  * ExtDep * s2 [1.151]** [1.093]* [1.881]**
Credit 1.291 0.843 0.705
  * ExtDep * s3 [1.022] [1.082] [2.005]
Credit -0.432 -0.890 -2.603
  * ExtDep * s4 [0.779] [0.904] [1.948]
Credit -0.969 -1.508 -0.360
  * ExtDep * s5 [1.170] [1.096] [1.584]
Stock 3.218 3.043 1.659
  * ExtDep * s1 [2.174] [2.148] [3.478]
Stock 3.456 3.002 5.911
  * ExtDep * s2 [1.810]* [1.761]* [2.944]**
Stock 1.211 0.481 0.718
  * ExtDep * s3 [1.946] [1.985] [2.884]
Stock -0.459 -1.141 -3.425
  * ExtDep * s4 [1.227] [1.348] [3.003]
Stock -1.031 -2.032 -0.698
  * ExtDep * s5 [2.373] [2.388] [2.736]
EPL -0.934 -0.891
  * JobflowsUS * s1 [0.573] [0.575]
EPL -1.277 -1.259
  * JobflowsUS * s2 [0.597]** [0.599]**
EPL -1.451 -1.423
  * JobflowsUS * s3 [0.636]** [0.638]**
EPL -1.218 -1.228
  * JobflowsUS * s4 [0.698]* [0.699]*
EPL -1.004 -1.026
  * JobflowsUS * s5 [0.476]** [0.473]**
Entry cost 0.364 0.349
  * TurnoverUS * s1 [0.412] [0.414]
Entry cost 0.336 0.337
  * TurnoverUS * s2 [0.220] [0.223]
Entry cost 0.379 0.365
  * TurnoverUS * s3 [0.271] [0.274]
Entry cost 0.025 0.026
  * TurnoverUS * s4 [0.278] [0.278]
Entry cost -0.024 -0.023
  * TurnoverUS * s5 [0.426] [0.428]
Entry cost -0.427 -0.465
  * RdlvaUS * s1 [0.416] [0.412]
Entry cost -0.349 -0.358
  * RdlvaUS * s2 [0.252] [0.255]
Entry cost 0.218 0.212
  * RdlvaUS * s3 [0.379] [0.378]
Entry cost -0.787 -0.779
  * RdlvaUS * s4 [0.536] [0.535]
Entry cost -1.201 -1.203
  * RdlvaUS * s5 [0.507]** [0.504]**
Observations 9189 9189 9189 9189 9034 9034
R-squared 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Entry rate
Variables of financial development: Credit or Stock instrumented by policy variables; Other variables: EPL: employment 
protection legislation; Entrycost: difficulty to start a business;
OLS regressions; robust standard errors in brackets; year dummies, size specific country and industry dummies; clusters 
by country/industry;
Interactions with the dependence in external finance, jobflows in US, Turnover rates in US, Relative growth of the sector in 
US;
  
Table 7.  Post-entry growth regressions, impact of financial development
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FD 0.251
  * ExtDep [0.091]***
Credit 0.392 0.446 0.569
  * ExtDep [0.145]*** [0.169]*** [0.264]**
Stock 0.462 0.617 0.880
  * ExtDep [0.255]* [0.239]** [0.343]**
Measure of financial 
development:
Observations 319 319 319 319 319 319 319
R-squared 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.32
Dependent variable: increase in the average employment among new surviving firms after the initial six years of life.
Interactions with the dependence in external finance (source: Klapper Leaven Rajan, 2006)
OLS regressions; robust standard errors in brackets; country and industry dummies included;
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Variables of financial development: (1) "FD": sum of credit and stock; (2) "Credit": domestic credit to private sector over GDP; (3) 
"Stock": stock market capitalization over GDP; (4) Credit instrumented by the share of governement banks, barriers to foreign entry in 
banking, entry requirements, regulation of banking activity; (5) Stock instrumented by contract enforcement, creditor rights, private or 
public registries, investor protection, bankrupty procedures; (6) Simple average of Credit sub-indices; (7) Simple average of Stock 
sub-indices
Post-entry growth
Outcome variables (private credit or stock 
market over GDP)
Instrumented by policy 
variables
Simple average of policy 
variables
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Post-entry growth regressions, controlling for other policy variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Credit 0.424 0.380 0.433
  * ExtDep [0.190]** [0.125]*** [0.165]***
Stock 0.841 0.527 0.623
  * ExtDep [0.391]** [0.181]*** [0.241]**
EPL 0.019 0.020
  * Jobflows US [0.028] [0.029]
Size at -0.214 -0.214
 entry [0.047]*** [0.046]***
Growth of  1.626 1.645
  all firms [0.762]** [0.763]**
Observations 291 291 319 319 309 309
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 3 30 . 3 30 . 4 20 . 4 20 . 3 50 . 3 5
Dependent variable: increase in the average employment among new surviving firms after the initial six years of life.
OLS regressions; robust standard errors in brackets; country and industry dummies included;
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Post-entry growth
Variables of financial development: Credit or Stock instrumented by policy variables; Other variables: EPL: employment 
protection legislation; Entrycost: difficulty to start a business;
Interactions with the dependence in external finance and jobflows in US (in the later case, US is dropped from the 
regressions)
 
 
 
 
 Table 9: Entry rates regressions, sensitivity analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Industry share -0.736 -0.743
[0.126]*** [0.125]***
Relative growth of VA 0.303 0.302
[0.274] [0.274]
Credit 2.527 3.164
  * ExtDep * s1 [0.925]*** [1.190]***
Credit 1.732 3.026
  * ExtDep * s2 [1.031]* [1.090]***
Credit 0.451 0.476
  * ExtDep * s3 [0.911] [1.206]
Credit -0.552 -0.538
  * ExtDep * s4 [0.799] [1.225]
Credit -0.421 -2.790
  * ExtDep * s5 [1.053] [1.457]*
Stock 2.966 3.635
  * ExtDep * s1 [1.279]** [2.090]*
Stock 1.977 3.295
  * ExtDep * s2 [1.212] [1.499]**
Stock 0.074 0.018
  * ExtDep * s3 [1.154] [1.710]
Stock 0.325 -0.529
  * ExtDep * s4 [1.149] [1.535]
Stock -0.281 -2.067
  * ExtDep * s5 [1.213] [2.102]
Credit 0.450
  * RdlvaUS * s1 [0.205]**
Credit 0.593
  * RdlvaUS * s2 [0.200]***
Credit 0.493
  * RdlvaUS * s3 [0.273]*
Credit -0.202
  * RdlvaUS * s4 [0.327]
Credit -0.153
  * RdlvaUS * s5 [0.190]
Stock 0.752
  * RdlvaUS * s1 [0.317]**
Stock 0.581
  * RdlvaUS * s2 [0.317]*
Stock 0.478
  * RdlvaUS * s3 [0.339]
Stock -0.391
  * RdlvaUS * s4 [0.440]
Stock -0.037
  * RdlvaUS * s5 [0.322]
Observations 10169 10169 8797 8797 9034 9034
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 3 20 . 3 20 . 3 10 . 3 10 . 3 00 . 3 0
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Entry rate
Variables of financial development: Credit or Stock instrumented by policy variables;
Interactions with the dependence in external finance (source: Klapper Leaven Rajan [06]) or the relative growth of value-
added in the US sector (source: STAN);
OLS regressions; robust standard errors in brackets; year dummies, size specific country and industry; clusters by 
country/industry;
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 10: Post-entry growth regressions, sensitivity analysis
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
Credit 0.016 0.307 0.177 0.270¤
  * ExtDep [0.017] [0.150]** [0.119] [0.167]
Stock 0.020 0.383 0.211 0.504
  * ExtDep [0.023] [0.216]* [0.156] [0.191]***
Observations 311 311 320 320 321 321 319 319
R-squared 0.44 0.44 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.34 0.35
OLS regressions; robust standard errors in brackets; country and industry dummies included;
¤ significant at 11%; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Variables of financial development: Credit or Stock instrumented by policy variables;
Interactions with the dependence in external finance (source: Klapper Leaven Rajan [06]);
Incumbent growth
post-entry growth after 5 
years
post-entry growth after 3 
years
Total employment 
growth
 
 
 
 
 
 
 